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INTRODUCTION 
 
This document is the second of two papers that consider current plans by the United 
States to expand military activities in outer space.  The first paper addressed the international 
reaction to such deployments, in particular the objections by the Chinese Mission to the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.   This paper describes and documents the allocation of 
funds in the FY04 budget request to three areas: 
 
• Force projection and space control (“Enhancing Space Operations”), 
• Space-based elements of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) System, and 
• Space-based command, control, and intelligence (“Integrated Focused Surveillance”). 
 
These three areas, identified by the Chinese and other states as drivers toward 
“weaponization,” also (and not coincidentally) underpin the anticipated modernization of U.S. 
strategic forces as outlined in the recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  The NPR endorsed “a 
New Triad, composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses (both 
active and passive), and a revitalized defense infrastructure . . . bound together by enhanced 
command and control (C2) and intelligence systems.”1 
 
 It is reasonable to conclude that the modernization of U.S. strategic forces and the 
expansion of U.S. military activities in outer space are linked—the transformational elements of 
the NPR’s New Triad are likely to be based in space.  The Air Force Space Command Strategic 
Master Plan supports this conclusion, stating that “Conventional, non-nuclear prompt global 
strikes from and through space and space-based T&E for missile defense will transform” U.S. 
strategic forces (Table 1: Space Force Application Roadmap).2  The Strategic Master Plan 
concludes: 
 
The latest nuclear posture review (NPR) speaks of the need to maintain enough capabilities to 
provide both a credible and adaptable deterrence posture. . . . Thus, our deterrence capabilities 
should be responsive to and adaptable in a dynamic security environment. Therefore, we remain 
committed to ensuring our ICBM arsenal is modernized to maintain an effective force and 
deterrent posture while pursuing a new generation of responsive prompt global strike capabilities.3 
 
The Command of United Strategic Command (STRATCOM), James O. Ellis, testified 
before Congress that the new space-based force application capabilities alluded to in the 
Strategic Master Plan will allow U.S. policy-makers to employ strategic forces in a much wider 
array of contingencies:   
 
Space capabilities will dramatically enhance US Strategic Command’s newly assigned global 
strike mission, which extends our long-standing and globally focused deterrent capabilities to the 
broader spectrum of conflict. The incorporation of advanced conventional, nonkinetic, and special 
operations capabilities into a full-spectrum contingency arsenal will enable the command to 
deliberately and adaptively plan for and deliver rapid, limited-duration, extended-range combat 
power anywhere in the world.4 
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 The NPR and the Strategic Master Plan followed several studies produced by the United 
States Space Command (SPACECOM) and the United States Air Force that articulated a strong 
role for space-based capabilities in strategic forces modernization.5  Some observers, particularly 
those in foreign governments and military establishments, expressed concern that the publication 
of the NPR and its companion documents—particularly the 2002 Joint Doctrine for Space 
Operations, the U.S. Air Force Space Command’s 2000 and 2002 Strategic Master Plans, and 
the 1998 SPACECOM Long Range Plan—signaled that the United States was pursuing an open-
ended strategic modernization, indicating U.S. ambitions that were equally open-ended and, 
perhaps, revisionist. 
 
 Indeed, the development of space-based capabilities does mark a substantial departure for 
United States foreign and military policy.  Many of these systems are widely recognized as 
“space weapons.”  The earliest of the documents to outline the role of space-based capabilities, 
the 1998 Long Range Plan, accepted this reality, noting an obstacle to its proposed use of space-
systems for strategic force modernization: “At present, the notion of weapons in space is not 
consistent with U.S. national policy. Planning for the possibility is a purpose of this plan should 
our civilian leadership decide that the application of force from space is in our national interest.”  
The 2002 Strategic Master Plan, however, is more demure, noting merely that “To fully develop 
and exploit potential Counterspace and space-based Space Force Application capabilities, some 
U.S. policies and international treaties may need to be reviewed and modified.”6 
 
Table 1: Space Force Application Roadmap 
U.S. Air Force Space Command Strategic Master Plan, FY ‘04 and Beyond (2002) pp.13-14.   
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 More importantly, however, the transformation envisioned by the Nuclear Posture 
Review represents a turn from the principle of mutual vulnerability—accepted during the Cold 
War—and a shift toward warfighting operations.  This shift coincides with a national security 
strategy that envisions the application of strategic warfighting capabilities across the spectrum of 
conflict and anticipates coercive and/or preventive force.  Although hailed by the Bush 
Administration as a strategy to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, NPR has done so 
largely by dramatically expanding the range of situations in which the United States would 
contemplate preventive interference.  This shift is consistent with a broader trend in the Bush 
Administration toward prevention and is rooted in the nuclear strategy backgrounds of important 
advisors like Keith Payne, principle author of the NPR and co-author of a 1981 article: “Victory 
is Possible.”7 
 
Objectors have long derided a strategic posture based on preventive warfare as needlessly 
provocative in light of the technological futility of the task.  Warfighting proponents view space 
systems as a solution to these objections.  Consider a recent article by Simon Worden, then at 
SPACECOM, and Martin France, at the Joint Staff, concerning the use of space-based 
capabilities in deterrent operations: 
 
The alternative deterrent strategy and the one that actually drove military developments 
throughout most of the Cold War was a “nuclear war fighting” deterrent. In this case, nuclear 
weapons were valued not so much because they had terrible consequences, but because they were 
the most potent weapons available. Both sides believed they could have an effective deterrent if 
they could raise the specter in the adversary’s mind that aggression would be met with a military 
response that would effectively defeat or seriously damage the aggressor’s military power. . . . 
Space systems, particularly weapons in space, were not very appealing to the nuclear warfighter, 
as they could not be directed against fielded forces of much value—at least at that time.8 
 
Worden, now at STRATCOM, and France conclude that “the foundation of any deterrence 
strategy [remains] rooted in the belief of the potential aggressor—be he near–peer state, lesser 
power, or non–state actor—that the U.S. has the forces necessary to cause irreparable harm to his 
economic and political power bases, and that the U.S. is willing to employ those tools to halt his 
aggression. The effective control of outer space and cyberspace and the ability to use those 
media to deliver devastating and precise strikes against an enemy’s critical assets and fielded 
forces can provide just that effect.”9 
 
 The Strategic Master Plan mirrors this language as it commits the Air Force Space 
Command to “emphasize four major areas to meet tomorrow’s challenges: 
 
First, AFSPC will continue to provide a formidable, modern nuclear deterrent capability . . . one 
that is robust and adaptable to meet the threats of a dynamic security environment.  AFSPC will 
also work to develop and expand its prompt global strike capabilities.  Leveraging the 
technologies of our modern deterrence forces, we will develop other responsive space strike 
capabilities that, with strong defenses and highly responsive infrastructure, will afford the Nation 
a range of options to address any current or future threat.”10 [ellipses in original] 
 
 Despite the enthusiasm displayed by Worden, France, and the Strategic Master Plan, the 
deployment of weapons in space may prove technologically and economically challenging.    
After examining the current budget request status of the three aforementioned capabilities (in 
essence, the core of the modernization effort outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review and the 
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Strategic Master Plan), this paper finds that the United States appears to be a few years away 
from the first systems that would be considered space weapons.  This conclusion is based on the 
announced levels of budgetary support and projected acquisition schedules described throughout 
the following pages. 
 
 “A few years” is a deceptively short time-frame.  If the large levels of funding 
programmed into the FY04 Budget Request are sustained, the funding will generate momentum 
toward deployment.  This holds particularly true because space weapons are embedded within a 
national security strategy and force modernization plan that emphasizes what the Rumsfeld 
Space Commission called “power projection in, from, and through space.”11 
 
 Moreover, the Pentagon is designing many systems of virtually no functionality to be 
deployed in initial test blocks as part of the “spiral development” acquisition process—a process 
designed to speed the introduction of new technologies into fielded military forces.  Dormant 
ASAT programs and the inherent anti-satellite capabilities of current ABM systems would also 
allow the Administration to conduct a space weapons test for political purposes on relatively 
short notice.  Although not fully operational, these systems do have the potential to be highly 
provocative as symbols of the long-term path for U.S. strategic forces modernization, as well as 
symbols of U.S. intentions. 
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SECTION ONE:  ENHANCING SPACE OPERATIONS 
 
 “Enhancing Space Operations” is one of six DOD force transformation goals.12  
“Enhancing Space Operations” refers to “investment,” i.e. research development testing and 
evalutation (RDT&E), and procurement spending on three types of programs: the Common 
Aerospace Vehicle, space control technologies, and directed energy technologies.13 
 
The FY04 budget request for “enhancing space operations” starts at $300 million in 
FY0414 then “ramps up quite sharply throughout the six-year future year defense program,” 
reaching a total of $5 billion over FY04-09.15 
 
 The FY04 request, with an average of $833 million in annual spending, is a dramatic 
(277%) increase over the President’s FY03 request of roughly $300 million in anticipated annual 
spending.16  The difference is impressive considering that the 2003 request was a 145% increase 
over its predecessor.  Additionally, even given a conservative estimate of a linear growth rate, to 
spend $5 billion over six years from today’s starting point of $300 million would mean spending 
$1.4 billion in 2009 alone.  (Table 2: Spending on Enhancing Space Operations the FY03/04 
budget requests). 
 
 A significant portion (approximately $2 billion) of spending in this transformation area, 
especially in the out years, remains classified.  DOD Comptroller Zakheim said “[enhancing] 
space operations . . . is a lot of the space control systems and other elements—many of which are 
classified. These two [elements] you can see—[space control technology and counterspace 
technologies]—this is the thin edge of the wedge. By the time you … aggregate the six-year plan 
Table 2: Spending on “Enhancing Space Operations” in the FY03/04 Budget Requests 
300
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FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009
FYDP 2003-2007
$1.5 billion ($300 million/year)
FYDP 2004-2009
$5.0 billion ($833 million/year)
Annual funding levels over FY2004-
2009, assuming a linear rate of increase. 
 
Sources: Congressional testimony and author estimates. 
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you're talking about considerable dollars there, but these are really cutting edge programs.”17 
 
 Although small as a portion of the overall request, the unclassified portion of spending on 
“enhancing space operations” is rather robust:  $134.2 million in FY04 and $928.6 million over 
FY04-09 (Table 3: Program Elements Comprising “Enhancing Space Operations.) 
 
The remainder of Section One considers in detail each of the program elements, and 
related programs comprising “Enhancing Space Operations.” 
 
Common Aero (or Aerospace) Vehicle (CAV) 
 
The Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) is a hypersonic glide vehicle, designed to carry a 
payload 3,000 nautical miles (5,500 km) downrange, with re-entry speeds of approximately 
4,000 feet per second (1200 m/s) and an accuracy (circular probable error) of 3 meters.  The 
CAV is designed to deliver a variety of 1000 pound (450 kg) submunition packages including  
 
• 1 Rigid Penetrator for hard and deeply buried targets 
• 6 Wide Area Autonomous Search Munitions (WAASM) 
• 4 Small Smart Bomb Systems for facility destruction 
• 6 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for intelligence gathering  
 
In the near-term, the CAV will be delivered by a ballistic missile or a space launch vehicle, but 
the DOD is considering a number of other delivery vehicles including a hypersonic vehicle 
(using technology from DARPA’s RASCAL and Hypersoar program), a space operations 
vehicle, or a space-based platform.18  Although the CAV is not a space weapon, per se, the 
program is a product of the DOD force modernization mission requirement that envisions 
warfighting from space.  DOD explicitly intends the CAV program as an evolutionary capability 
toward two high-speed aerospace system concepts “that provide guidance for integration and 
technology assessment studies”: a hypersonic weapons system and a military space plane.  These 
are, without question, space weapons.  
 
Table 3: Program Elements Comprising “Enhancing Space Operations” 
Program PE No. FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) 0604856F  0 0 12.2 21.7 27.3 32.6 31.5 39.5
Space Control Technology 0603438F 29.0 13.6 14.7 15.8 14.2 23.0 30.6 40.3
Counterspace Technologies 0604421F 0 39.5 82.6 76.1 27.8 32.8 28.9 77.0
Multi Disc. Space Tec.* 0602500F 0 1.2 5.1 5.1 5.4 5.4 5.4 4.7
Multi-Disc. Adv. Dev. Space Tec.* 0603500F 0 14.6 19.6 23.8 26.5 31.4 33.9 35.8
TOTAL   29.0 68.9 134.2 142.5 101.2 125.2 130.3 197.3
*Non-directed energy programs in this PE omitted 
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The Hypersonic Weapons System—pursued under DARPA’s Project FALCON (Force 
Application and Launch from CONUS Technology Demonstration)—is a DOD effort to address 
a long-standing mission requirement for “conventional global, prompt response” with a total 
response time of “hours.”19  In December 2002 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Air 
Force and DARPA to establish a joint program office to accelerate the Common Aero Vehicle 
(CAV) effort to meet this requirement.  As a consequence, the CAV is funded as a “new start” in 
the FY04 budget at $12.2 million (Table 4: CAV and Hypersoar Funding).  The House Armed 
Services Committee recommended increasing funding of the CAV to $24.2 million.20 
 
 The CAV was expected to achieve initial operating capability (IOC) from a ballistic 
missile in 2010, although recent DARPA documents suggest that flight demonstrations may 
continue through 2009 (Table 5: Notional Timeline for Project FALCON).  These estimates are 
purely notional—DARPA documents state that “this is only a baseline plan and better ideas are 
solicited based on specific contractor technology development plans.”21 
 
Table 5: Notional Timeline for Project FALCON 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, FALCON: Force Application and Launch from CONUS Technology 
Demonstration PHASE I SOLICITATION 03-XX (June 17, 2003) p.7. 
Table 4: CAV and Hypersoar Funding 
Cost (U.S.$ in  millions) FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
0604856F Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) 12.2 21.7 27.3 32.6 31.5 39.5
0603285E Advanced Aerospace Systems (HyperSoar)*  7.5 21.5 25.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
*Other programs in PE 0603285E omitted  
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The CAV is expected to be followed by an enhance performance CAV (enhanced CAV) 
that would have a greater range (9,000 nmi/16,700 km downrange) and improved 
maneuverability (3,000 nmi/5,500 km cross-range).  The enhanced performance CAV would be 
delivered by a Small Launch Vehicle, which would also be capable of placing a 1,000 kg satellite 
in a 450 km, 79° inclination sun-synchronous orbit.  DARPA anticipates that CAV technologies 
could eventually support the development of a Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle by 2025 that would 
carry 12,000 lbs (5,400 kg)—up to six CAVs—9,000 nmi (16,700 km) in two hours. 
 
Unclassified funding levels remain considerably below unofficial Air Force estimates that 
developing and procuring 70-100 CAVs would cost between $800 million- $1.3 billion.  At this 
time, program work remains focused on concept design; requirements analysis; and various 
design studies, systems engineering, and program assessments—all activities intended to lead to 
the selection of a final design.  Additional funding may come from the efforts of the House 
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees to add $100 million to the FY04 Budget 
Request “to begin research and development work on a new deep strike bomber …[to] help 
address basing problems highlighted during Operation Iraqi Freedom.”22 
 
 The CAV is also one of three programs designed to operate together as the second stage 
of the “Military Space Plane,” a distinct (but complementary) integrating concept to the 
Hypersonic Weapons System.  The other second stage programs are the Space Maneuver Vehicle 
and a Modular Insertion Stage (MIS) for the purpose of boosting payloads into geosynchronous 
orbit (Table 6: Military Space Plane Concept of Operations).  The CAV, SMV, and MIS would 
be delivered to low earth orbit by the system’s first stage, a hypersonic Space Operations Vehicle 
(SOV).23 
 
Table 6: Military Space Plane (MSP) Concept of Operations 
First Stage  
 
Space Operations Vehicle (SOV) 
Reusable first stage capable of lifting a  
12,000 lb upper stage to with 2,000-4,000 lb 
payload to low earth orbit. 
 
 
 
Second Stage   
 
Modular insertion stage (MIS) 
Low cost expandable upper stage 
Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV) 
Reusable satellite bus 
Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) 
Maneuvering re-entry vehicle 
 
Adapted from: Simon Worden, “Building a New U.S. Strategic Command” (August 7, 2002). 
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The future of the military space plane concept, particularly the SMV and SOV, depends 
greatly on the development of technology within NASA’s Space Launch Initiative, particularly 
the X-37 and Next Generation Launch Technologies (NGLT) (Table 7: NASA Spending on the 
Space Launch Initiative).  The Space Maneuver Vehicle is expected to draw heavily on concepts 
tested by the X-37 Orbital Vehicle, a technology demonstrator, rather than a prototype 
spacecraft.  NASA anticipates a Critical Design Review (CDR) for the X-37 Orbital Vehicle in 
early 2005, followed by an orbital flight test in CY06.   
 
 The U.S. Air Force declined a 2001 request from NASA and Air Force Space Command 
to take a greater role in the X-37 Orbital Vehicle, citing concerns that the test vehicle would not 
demonstrate technologies relevant for military systems (The Air Force also declined to fund two 
other NASA programs—X-33 and X-34—that were subsequently canceled).24   It should be 
noted that the X-37 Orbital Vehicle is a separate program from the X-37 Approach and Landing 
Test Vehicle, which will validate system performance of the approach, landing, and turnaround 
operations for the Orbital Space Plane. 
 
The Space Operations Vehicle is also expected to rely heavily on technologies generated 
by (NGLT).  The NGLT program was created as part of a November 2002 restructuring of 
NASA efforts to develop a Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle.  After cost estimates 
for developing a new reusable launch vehicle (RLV) by 2010 suggested that the program might 
cost two or four times the original program goal of $10 billion, NASA developed a new 
“Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP)” as part of the 2003 budget amendment process.  
Under the new ISTP, NASA will now invest $2.4 billion over 2003-2007 for Next Generation 
Launch Technologies, deferring a full-scale development decision on an RLV until 2009 and an 
initial flight to 2015.25  
Table 7: NASA Spending on the Space Launch Initiative 
Cost (U.S.$ in millions) FY02 FY03 FY04
2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle 465.4 0 0
Space Transfer & Launch Technology 69.7 0 0
Orbital Space Plane (OSP) Program 0 295.7 550.2
Design & Integration 0 75.4 324.2 
Technology & Demonstrations 0 220.3 226.0 
X-37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) 0 177.6 178.0 
Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) 0 19.7 18.0 
Pad Abort Demonstrator (PAD) 0 23.0 30.0 
X-37 Orbital Vehicle  - - -
Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) Program 0 583.7 514.5
Total: Space Launch Initiative (Technology) 535.1 879.4 1,064.7
Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
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Both efforts rely heavily on investments in hypersonic technology for flight and space 
access.  The Department of Defense (along with NASA) is now pursuing an initiative under the 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE) called the National Aerospace Initiative 
(NAI).  A technology initiative, the NAI coordinates research and development in high 
speed/hypersonics, space access, and space technology.26  The NAI will not be funded by a 
single service or agency, but will define common goals and coordinate activities across NASA 
and the military services.   
 
 Although the FY04 Budget Request contains some budget lines specifically for NAI 
activities within the Army (PE 0602303A/G02 and PE0603313A/G03) and the Air Force 
(0603211F 5099 and 0603216F 5098), the initiative is too new to have substantially affected the 
request (Table 8: Selected “National Aerospace Initiative” Programs in the FY04 Budget).  
Outyear funding for the Air Force’s hypersonics program, for example, will not be addressed 
until the President's budget development for FY05. 
 
In the meantime, many relevant Air Force research efforts in hypersonic technologies 
remain decentralized in other programs.  Despite the lack of representation in the FY04 request, 
the new focus on hypersonics did, according to Ronald Sega, Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering, affect budget decisions.  According to Sega’s testimony, “In the FY04 budget 
request, the Department focused the increased investment into hypersonic technology, investing 
over $150M additional funds in hypersonics.”27 
 
The Senate Appropriations Committee, citing concerns that the Administration’s budget 
request lacked “concise, unified submission that links all these projects together for a clearly 
defined, clearly stated goal that addresses the overall initiative”— refused to provide the Air 
Force Program with the $81.2 million it had sought for two hypersonics initiatives (National 
Aerospace Initiative and Advanced Aerospace Propulsion).28 
 
The Senate Appropriations Committee also cut $50 million from other NAI efforts scattered 
throughout the budget (see Table 9: Other Senate Appropriations Committee Reductions to the 
National Aerospace Initiative).  Although the Senate Appropriations Committee noted that the 
remaining funding was still an increase over funding levels for previous years, the Senate’s 
decision to cut more than $130 million in hypersonics funding
Table 8: Selected “National Aerospace Initiative” Programs in the FY04 Budget 
Program Service PE No. FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
National Aerospace Initiative* USAF 0603211F 5099 0 0 42.3  
Advanced Aerospace Propulsion USAF 0603216F 5098 0 0 38.9 0 0 0 0 0
NAI Applied Research Army 0602303A/G02 0 0 11.9 14.7 11.8 11.8 7.9 0
NAI Advanced Technology Army 0603313A/G03 0 0 2.9 0 0 2.9 6.9 14.7
*“Outyear funding … will be addressed in the FY05 President’s Budget Development.” 
Source: Air Force and Army RDT&E Descriptive Summaries. 
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Table 9: Other Senate Appropriations Committee Reductions to the National Aerospace Initiative 
Program Element (number and name) Senate Appropriations Committee Reference Reduction 
0601102F Defense Research Sciences Hypersonics funding [NAI] 2.0 
  Space Access [NAI 0.2 
0602102F Materials Materials for Structures, Propulsion, and Subsystems 0.2 
0602114N Power Projection Applied Research Hypersonics funding [NAI]—excludes HyFly 1.9 
  Space Access [NAI]—excludes HyFly 2.5 
0602201F Aerospace Vehicle Technologies  Structures [NAI] 0.7 
  Aerospace Vehicle Technology [NAI] 4.1 
0602203F Aerospace Propulsion  Hypersonics funding [NAI] 14.0 
  Rocket Propulsion Technology [NAI 1.0 
0602303A Missile Technology NAI Applied Research 1.9 
0602500F Multi-Disciplinary Space Technology High Speed Airbreathing Propulsion Technology [NAI] 0.7 
  Multi-Disciplinary Space Technology [NAI] 4.2 
0602601F Space Technology Space Craft Vehicle Technology [NAI] 1.9 
0603112F Advanced Materials for Weapons Systems National Aerospace Initiative 1.6 
  Space and Missile Rocket Propulsion [NAI] 0.9 
0603114N Power Projection Advanced Technology Hypersonics funding [NAI]—excludes HyFly 4.7 
  Space Access [NAI]—excludes HyFly 0.2 
0603285E Advanced Aerospace Systems Hypersonics funding [NAI] 2.8 
  Space Access [NAI 1.7 
0603313A Missile and Rocket Advanced Technology NAI Advanced Technology 0.5 
0603401F Advanced Spacecraft Technology Ballistic Missile Technology [NAI] 0.5 
0603500F Multi-Disciplinary Adv. Dev. Space Technology Rocket Propulsion Demonstration [NAI 1.6 
Total 49.8 
Senate Report 108-87.  
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stands in contrast to efforts in the House to add $100 million for next-generation strike platforms. 
 
In addition to concerns about program management and political support, the National 
Aerospace Initiative may also be hampered by disputes between NASA and DOD.  One potential 
area of conflict is NASA’s focus on more technically straightforward hydrocarbon-fueled first-
stage designs for the future Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV).29  The Air Force Scientific 
Advisory Board concluded in 2000 that a hydrogen-fueled first stage would better meet military 
needs because air-breathing jets can use the fuel to power a return to the launch site.  NASA is 
focused on more accessible hydrocarbon fuels and has cut funding for research on hydrogen 
engines. 
 
Space Control and Counterspace Technologies 
 
 Space control comprises three mission areas: space situational awareness (SSA), 
defensive counterspace (DCS), and offensive counterspace (OCS).  The latter category includes 
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.  The FY04 budget contains $134.8 million ($1.5 billion over the 
FYDP) for enhancing space situational awareness and $91.4 million ($635 million over the 
FYDP) for defensive and offensive counterspace.30 
 
 The Space Control Technology program element is an Air Force program that focuses on 
technology planning, development, demonstrations, and prototyping as well as modeling, 
simulations, and exercises (Table 10: PE 0603438F Space Control Technology).  The most 
visible program within this element is the “Space Range.”  The Space Range is a “virtual” test 
range that the Air Force intends to base at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada in order to conduct 
“exercises, training, and tactics development for Space Control systems.”31 
 
The Space Control Technology PE is also home to the Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite (KE 
ASAT) interceptor, which was transferred from the Army to the Air Force as part of Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s designation of the Air Force as “Executive Agent” for space.  Advocates for the KE 
ASAT had long wanted control wrested from the Army, a branch some Congressional 
proponents considered lacking in enthusiasm for the endeavor.32  Although the Pentagon did not 
request any funding for the KE ASAT, the Senate Armed Services Committee authorized $4 
million for the program.  As a result, the final budget authorization will have to be worked out in 
committee (Table 11: Congressional Changes to PE 0603438F Space Control Technology 
Authorization).33 
Table 10: PE 0603438F Space Control Technology 
Cost (U.S.$ in millions) FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Technology Insertion Planning and Analysis 29.0 13.6 9.4 9.4 9.5 12.6 15.7 20.6
Space Range 0 0 5.3 6.4 4.7 10.5 14.8 19.6
Total 29.0 13.6 14.7 15.8 14.2 23.0 30.6 40.3
USAF RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/ 
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 Despite the indifference of senior military officers to the KE ASAT (one Air Force 
official called the KE ASAT an “iffy fly swatter in the sky”), the Senate has provided 
appropriations—some of which have been quite large (Table 12: Congressional Appropriations 
for Kinetic Energy Anti-satellite Program 1996-2004).34  The Senate Appropriations Committee 
has proposed appropriations Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite.35  Although the KE ASAT’s 
Senatorial patron, Robert Smith (R-NH), was defeated in a re-election bid, recent increases in 
authorization and appropriations suggest that support for the program has survived his departure.  
The programmatic effect of this sort of budgeting is unclear.  GAO released a December 2000 
report that found the program “in a state of disarray;”36 nevertheless, the Pentagon regards the 
program as completed, and program officers believe they could conduct an on orbit 
demonstration for about $60 million (an amount that would cover two flight test vehicles and one 
spare).37 
 
The second principle investment account for space control is Air Force counterspace 
systems (See: Table 13: PE 0604421F Counterspace Systems).  This PE funds three programs: 
 
• Counter Satellite Communications System 
• Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System 
• Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) 
  
Together, these programs are often called “promising space control initiatives” and were, until 
2003, funded out of PE: 0603438F as demonstration and validation efforts.  The shift in budget 
categories indicates that the programs have moved into the engineering and manufacturing 
development stage. 
 
The Counter Satellite Communications System (CSCS) is a ground-based, mobile system 
“intended to disrupt satellite-based communications used by an enemy for military C3.”  The 
Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System (CSRS), currently in the initial design phase, is 
also ground-based and designed to impair reconnaissance satellites with “reversible, non-
damaging effects.”  These two systems, which are offensive counterspace systems, are expected 
Table 11: Congressional Changes to PE 0603438F Space Control Technology Authorization 
Request House Senate Conference 
14.7 14.7 18.7 ??? 
House and Senate Armed Services Committee Reports. 
Table 12: Congressional Appropriations for Kinetic Energy Anti-satellite (KE ASAT) Program 1996-2004 
 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04
Requested by DOD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senate Markup 30.0 75.0 80.0 0 41.0 20.0 0 0 7.5
Appropriated by Congress 30.0 50.0 37.5 0 10.0 3.0 0 0 ?
Derived from annual committee reports on annual national defense appropriations requests. 
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to reach initial operating capability in 2004 and 2007, respectively.  The Rapid Attack, 
Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS) is a defensive counterspace system 
designed to aid the detection, reporting, identification, location, and classification of attacks 
against valuable space assets.  RAIDRS is planned to achieve initial operational capability in 
FY08. 
 
The third space control investment account is the Air Force’s SPACETRAK program 
element, which comprises most funding for the Space Surveillance Network and other space 
situational awareness efforts (Table 14: PE 0305910F SPACETRACK). 
 
In addition to the ground-based sensors in the Space Surveillance Network (SSN)—such 
as the HAVE STARE X-band radar, the GEODSS network and the Navy Space Surveillance 
Fence—DOD is developing a space-based surveillance system called the Space-Based Space 
Surveillance (SBSS) satellite program.  SBSS, which builds on the Mid-Course Space 
Experiment (MSX) designed by Lincoln Laboratory, seeks to improve the accuracy and 
timeliness of satellite tracking data.38 
Table 14: PE 0305910F SPACETRACK 
Cost (U.S. $ in Millions)  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Have Stare Radar 4279 8.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GEODSS Sustainment 4791 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Space Based Space Surveillance 4930 2.0 9.8 79.0 109.5 84.7 115.6 196.2 204.9
Space Situational Awareness Initiatives 5011 8.3 11.7 15.5 12.1 16.3 10.9 9.3 7.6
Sensor Service Life Extension Programs  A008 0 0 19.9 31.8 25.5 30.0 9.7 0.0
Orbital Deep Space Imager (ODSI) A009 0 0 3.9 8.9 24.8 57.5 187.4 217.3
Total Program Element  (PE) Cost  21.9 21.5 118.2 162.3 151.3 214.3 402.3 429.3
USAF RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/ 
Table 13: PE 0604421F Counterspace Systems 
Cost (U.S.$ in millions) FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Counter Satellite Communications System 0.0 9.1 9.6 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.8
Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System 0.0 23.5 66.4 53.4 5.0 14.2 9.8 3.7
Other procurement, Air Force 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.9 47.5 38.1 31.2 35.3
Rapid Identification Detection and Reporting System 0.0 6.9 6.6 16.4 16.5 12.1 12.4 66.5
Other procurement, Air Force 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.7 26.9 23.6
Total 0.0 39.5 82.6 85.9 75.4 96.7 87.0 136.0
USAF RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/ 
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Microsatellites 
 Although the projects that constitute the Counterspace Systems program element appear 
to be exclusively ground-based systems, the Strategic Master Plan commits the Air Force to 
“transform its Counterspace capabilities by fielding revolutionary space-based capabilities 
through the mid- and far-term.”  
 
 Air Force documents suggest that on-orbit counterspace systems will be deployed on 
microsatellite platforms—small satellites weighing less than 100 kg.  A 1999 Air Force 
Microsatellite Technology and Requirements Study concluded that the idea of using such 
satellites “deserves high priority and offers a low-cost, low-risk method of achieving an SOI 
[space object identification] and Counterspace capability.”39  The 2000 edition of the Strategic 
Master Plan anticipated two notional counterspace microsatellites: the “Microsat Payload 
Imager” and the “Orbit Flexible Counterspace Microsat.” 
 
 The FY04 budget request contains about $70 million for three microsatellite programs 
that are Air Force Research Laboratory technology demonstrators: Mighty Sat, TechSat 21, and 
the Experimental Satellite System (See Table 15: Spending in Program Elements Containing 
Military Microsatellites). 
 
 Although the mission tasks for the various microsatellite efforts in Air Force budget 
documents do not identify the project being funded, one can map AFRL project names to 
program elements by following Congressional plus-ups in recent years.40  All three programs 
also likely receive some financial support for spaceflight services out of the Space Test Program 
(PE 0605864F).  The Space Test Program does not, however, provide funds to construct 
experimental instruments or analyze the returned data.41 
 
 These systems are test beds for future microsatellite efforts.  Dr. Donald C. Daniel, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, testified before Congress that these three programs 
will “provide the technology base for 10-100 kilogram microsatellites that will offer new options 
in many areas of space applications. Applications previously considered not cost-effective due to 
size and weight limitations, such as satellite servicing or launch on demand, become possible.”42 
Table 15: Spending in Program Elements Containing Military Microsatellites  
Cost ($ in millions)  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
PE 0602601F Project 8809 “MightySat” 33.6 36.7 27.6 30.4 31.4 36.2 43.6 46.6
PE 0603401F Project 2181 “TechSat 21” 16.0 14.9 20.0 16.1 16.2 18.5 35.2 35.3
 Project 3834 “XSS” 22.8 14.9 20.5 18.6 25.1 27.5 26.5 26.7
Total   72.4 66.5 68.1 65.1 72.7 82.2 105.3 108.6
PE 0605864F Space Test Program, Project 2617 46.8 49.1 42.9 44.6 45.2 46.2 57.4 58.1
 Air Force RDT&E Descriptive Summaries. 
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 Recent and anticipated AFRL microsatellites range from 30-150 kg.  All three programs 
are designed to serve as test beds.  The MightySat program is most explicitly intended in this 
manner, while the TechSat and XSS programs focus on particular missions—such as space-
based radar and imaging—that demonstrate technical challenges such as flying in formation and 
operating autonomously (see Table 16: Characteristics of Selected Air Force Microsatellites).  
Short descriptions of these three programs follow. 
 
 The MightySat program is the “primary space demonstration” platform for the Air 
Force.43  According to the Defense Technology Area Plan, each MightySat “functions as an 
experimental test bed exploring such objectives as demonstrating concept feasibility, developing 
a critical knowledge base to exploit new capabilities, identifying system risks under space 
environmental conditions, and providing flight heritage for critical components scheduled for 
deployment on future DoD space systems.”44 
 
 MightySat I was launched in December 1998 with five advanced technology 
demonstrations regarding the structure, power, and avionics for microsatellites.  That launch was 
followed by a larger satellite, MightySat II, which was anticipated to be the first of 5 such 
satellites launched 18-24 months apart.45   The FY04 budget request for the MightySat program 
contains $14 million in Spacecraft Vehicle Technologies (Project 8809) to develop “innovative 
microsatellite architectures and advanced satellite bus technologies that could enable applications 
such as space protection, counterspace capabilities, sparse aperture sensing, on-orbit formation 
flying, inter-satellite communications, distributed processing, and responsive payloads.” 
 
Table 16: Characteristics of Selected Air Force Microsatellites 
System Launch Date 
Orbit 
(km, °) 
Dimensions 
(m m m) 
Mass 
(kg) Contractor Type 
MightySat I 1998 400, 52 0.5 0.5 0.5 60 Orbital Technology Demonstration 
MightySat II.1 2000 600, 98 0.7 0.9 0.9 120 Spectrum Astro Technology Demonstration 
MightySat II.2 TBD    Spectrum Astro Technology Demonstration 
TechSat 21* 2006 600, 35 0.8 1.1 1.1 150 Microsat Systems Sparse Aperture Radar 
XSS-10 2003 800, 40 0.5 0.5 0.9 30 Boeing Autonomous Operations 
XSS-11 2004 800, 65-97 0.6 0.6 1.0 125 Lockheed Martin Autonomous Operations 
Sources: See footnotes 39-50; 
*The TechSat 21 project will comprise a cluster of three satellites on-orbit operating within 1000 meters; the 
dimensions given do not include two 2.3 3.0 m solar arrays deployed on-orbit. 
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 Unlike the MightySat, which is designed to validate a wide range of technologies for 
microsatellites, the remaining two programs—the TechSat 21 and XSS series—have more 
specific missions. 
 
 Radar resolution is a function of the size of its aperture—a problem, given the expense 
and technical difficulty of launching large objects into space.  The TechSat 21 (Technology 
Satellite of the 21st Century) experiment poses a solution: a three-microsatellite constellation that 
will fly in close (100-500 m) formation to demonstrate so-called distributed or sparse aperture 
radar.  This cluster formation offers a number of advantages, including the ability to reconfigure 
and modernize satellite components. 
 The FY04 budget request contains $20 million for programs, including $2.8 million to 
“Complete and deliver microsatellite cluster management software and integrate into the 
distributed architecture test bed in preparation for a flight demonstration of collaborating three 
microsatellite constellation.”  The Air Force anticipates a 2006 launch date.  The demonstration 
of a satellite constellation that can fly in close formation may also benefit mission concepts 
beyond radar, including “on-orbit satellite inspection, advanced sensing, and aircraft missile 
launch of microsatellites.”46 
The Experimental Satellite System (XSS) series is designed as “a building block” for a 
future platform that can identify space objects and intercept satellites.47  Just as the TechSat21 
demonstrates cluster management through a sparse aperture radar mission, the XSS series also 
demonstrates autonomous on-orbit operations by performing imaging missions.  The first XSS 
satellite, the XSS-10, was launched from the space shuttle in 2003 and conducted a 24-hour 
imaging mission (See Table 17: XSS-10).48  James Engle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Science, Technology and Engineering, testified that the XSS-10 “demonstrated 
semi-autonomous operations and visual inspection in close proximity of an object in space—in 
this case a Delta II upper stage.”49 
 
Table 17: XSS-10 
  
This image (left) of an expended Delta II launch vehicle was taken from approximately 100 meters by the XSS-10 
(illustration, right) on January 30, 2003 
Source: Air Force Research Laboratory 
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The Air Force is now preparing a Fall 2004 launch of the XSS-11, a larger microsatellite 
designed to remain in orbit for an entire year.  The XSS-11 experiment is envisioned as a 
pathfinder for the Microsat Payload imager and could also support offensive counterspace 
missions.  In fact, “[t]he single strongest recommendation” of the Air Force Microsatellite Study 
“is the deployment, as rapidly as possible, of XSS-10-based satellites able to intercept, image, 
and, if needed, take action against a target satellite.”50  The FY04 budget contains $14.4 million 
to “design, develop, integrate, and test autonomous microsatellites to demonstrate integrated 
technology concepts for operations around a non-cooperative resident space object” as part of the 
funding for the XSS series in the Integrated Space Technology Demonstration subelement (3834) 
of Air Force PE 0603401F, Advanced Spacecraft Technology. 
 
 In addition to these three programs, Air Force PE 0601102F, Defense Research 
Sciences contains $8.5 million in Electronics (Project 2305) to “research the scientific barriers to 
miniaturization of components” with a goal of reducing “satellite cost, weight, and size each by a 
factor of ten.”  The Air Force also spends on propulsion technology development for 
microsatellites.  PE 0603500F, Multi-Disciplinary Advanced Development Space Technology, 
contains $6.5 million to “prepare for delivery of the advanced small satellite propulsion 
demonstration unit for a microsatellite formation flying demonstration supporting improved 
capability for Air Force imaging requirements.”  PE 0602500F, Multi-Disciplinary Space 
Technology, contains $5.2 million in Project 5026, Rocket Propulsion Component Technology 
to—among other tasks—continue “development of microsatellites (<25 kg) propulsion systems 
(e.g., plasma thrusters) for advanced imaging missions.”  AFRL and DARPA also fund ten 
university research centers. 
 
Even with the overwhelming amount of programming for space control under the control 
of the Air Force, the Army maintains a space control PE under its missile defense systems 
integration efforts (Table 18: PE 0603308A Army Missile Defense Systems Integration).  This 
PE was home to the KE ASAT before it was transferred to the control of the Air Force. 
 
 
Table 18: PE 0603308A   Army Missile Defense Systems Integration (Dem/Val) 
Cost (U.S.$ in millions) FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
978 Space Control 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.9 4.9
990 Space And Missile Defense Integration 40.7 50.8 8.6 8.7 8.5 8.4 7.9 6.3
Total 41.7 51.8 9.6 9.6 9.4 9.4 12.8 11.2
 (Other projects in PE 0603308A omitted).   U.S. Army RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/.  
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Directed Energy Programs 
 
DOD has myriad directed energy programs, many of which are not “space-unique,” i.e. 
not intended solely for missions involving space systems (Table 19: DOD Directed Energy 
Programs).51  
Table 19: DOD Directed Energy Programs 
 Cost (U.S.$ in millions)  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06  FY07  FY08 FY09 
High Energy Laser Research Initiatives 0601108F
High Energy Laser Research Init. 5097 0.0 0.0 12.1 12.4 12.5 12.7 12.9 13.1
Multi Disciplinary Space Tec.1 0602500F
Laser & Imaging Space Tec.2 5023 0 1.2 5.1 5.1 5.4  5.4 5.4 4.7 
High Energy Laser Research  0602890F
High Energy Laser Research 5096 0.0 0.0 41.9 45.5 48.4 51.8 52.2 53.0
Directed Energy Technology 0602605F
Lasers & Imaging Tec. 4866 18.8 21.8 20.6 20.9 23.9 27.2 26.5 26.3 
Adv. Weapons & Survivability Tec. 4867 14.7 15.8 14.7 15.4 15.7 18.0 17.3 17.3 
Multi-Disciplinary Adv Dev Space Tec1 0603500F
Adv. Optics & Laser Space Tec. 2 5031 0 14.6 19.6 23.8 26.5 31.4 33.9 35.8 
Advanced Weapons Technology 0603605F
Advanced Optics Tec. 3150 0  21.5 23.8 0 0 0 0 0 
High Power Solid State Laser Tec. 3151 5.0  8.6 14.2 15.1 15.6  15.9  16.2 16.4 
High Power Microwave Tec. 3152  7.5 12.7  8.4 11.5 11.6 13.7 11.9 12.1 
High Energy Laser Tec. 3647 26.7 8.3 4.4   3.6  2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 
High Energy Laser Adv. Tec. Program 0603924F
High Energy Laser Adv. Tec.  5095 0 0 10.9 8.6 6.2   3.8 3.9  4.0 
DOD High Energy Laser Test Facility 0605605A
DOD HELSTF E97 22.4 16.7 17.8 18.0 18.2 18.6 19.0 19.5
Total  95.1 121.2 193.5 179.8 186 200.6 201.2 204.2
1. Other programs in this PE omitted. 
2. Space Unique Directed Energy Programs. 
 Lewis, Page 20 of 56
 
From the perspective of DOD, two such programs are the most important: 
 
• Multi Disciplinary Space Technology 
• Multi-Disciplinary Advanced Development Space Technology 
 
The Space-based Laser (SBL) program is funded out of the Missile Defense Agency Budget and 
will be addressed in a separate section of this paper. 
 
The Multi-Disciplinary Space Technology PE reflects the Space Commission’s 
recommendation to consolidate all “space-unique” programs; and the large jump in funding 
reflects transfer of civilian salaries.   This PE is a “Budget Activity 2: Applied Research” 
program and is designed to enhance the technology base by focusing on questions about the 
technical feasibility of space-oriented lasers and imaging technologies for military applications.   
 
The Multi-Disciplinary Advanced Development Space Technology PE, which falls under 
“Budget Activity 3: Advanced Technology Development,” houses all the space-unique directed 
energy programs that demonstrate technologies for military applications.  For example, the FY04 
budget line has $5.3 million to conduct “atmospheric compensation/beam control experiments 
for applications including antisatellite weapons, relay mirror systems, satellite tests and 
diagnostics, and high-resolution satellite imaging.”   
 
 These two efforts—Multi Disciplinary Space Technology and Multi-Disciplinary 
Advanced Development Space Technology—are new program elements created in the FY04 
budget request by consolidating the space unique tasks in PE 0602605F Directed Energy 
Technology and PE 0603605F Advanced Weapons Technology.  This action was recommended 
by the Rumsfeld Space Commission.  Space-unique efforts in PE 0602605F Directed Energy 
Technology, Project 4866 were transferred to Project 5023 in Multi Disciplinary Space 
Technology PE, while space-unique efforts in PE 0603605F Advanced Weapons Technology 
Projects 3150 and 3647 were transferred to Project 5031 in Multi-Disciplinary Advanced 
Development Space Technology. 
 
In addition to these four directed energy programs, the Department of Defense operates a 
High Energy Laser (HEL) Joint Technology Office (JTO) and a High Energy Laser test facility.   
The JTO is designed to fund technology efforts that might impact multiple HEL systems and 
multiple service missions.   It was created in response to a March 2000 report by the Defense 
High Energy Laser Review Panel which called for the creation of a joint office “tasked with the 
development and day-to-day management of a joint program for revitalizing HEL S&T and 
serving as a clearinghouse for new S&T initiatives proposed by DoD components.”52  In 
fulfillment of these directives HEL/JTO operates three programs: 
 
• High Energy Research Initiatives is a “Budget Activity 1: Basic Research” 
program that funds theoretical, computational, and experimental investigations, 
principally at universities. 
• High Energy Research is a “Budget Activity 2: Applied Research” program that 
funds research aimed “at translating fundamental scientific knowledge into proof-
of-concept solutions.” 
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• High Energy Laser Advanced Technology Program is a “Budget Activity 3: 
Advanced Technology Development” program to translate “technology solutions 
for broadly defined military problems into demonstrated pay-offs such as 
increased capabilities, increased supportability, or increased affordability.” 
 
 The DOD High Energy Laser Test Facility is home to the Mid Infra Red Chemical Laser 
(MIRACL) that conducted a 1997 test firing against a U.S. MSTI-3 imagery satellite in low-earth 
orbit to gather data on the vulnerability of U.S. military satellites to anti-satellite weapons.53  The 
Army is transitioning the facility into a multi-service test bed to share operating costs.  The FY04 
funding request is largely allocated to carry out operations, maintenance, and support, as well as 
conduct some testing for the Navy’s directed energy project office. 
 
 
Other “Enhancing Space Operations” Programs 
 
 In addition to funding these three categories of programs—CAV, space control and 
directed energy—to enhance space operations systems, DARPA is funding several technology 
programs that warrant attention (Table 20: DARPA Space Programs and Technology ASP-02).   
 
 Among the most important of these programs is “Orbital Express Space Operations 
Architecture,” a demonstration program designed to validate the technical feasibility of satellite 
constellations capable of conducting robotic, autonomous on-orbit refueling and reconfiguration.  
By enabling satellites to refuel and reconfigure (thus dramatically lengthening their service lives 
and simultaneously increasing the rate at which new technology can be deployed), such 
technology would dramatically alter the architecture of U.S. space systems.54 
Table 20: DARPA Space Programs and Technology ASP-02 
Cost (U.S.$ in millions) FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Orbital Express Space Operations Architecture 0.0 39.6 55.1 45.1
Space Surveillance Telescope 0.0 4.0 9.0 17.0
Innovative Space-Based Radar Antenna Technology (ISAT) 0.0 14.9 39.8 48.0
Deep View 0.0 4.2 9.5 10.2
Responsive Access, Small Cargo, Affordable Launch (RASCAL) 0.0 24.3 38.5 33.4
Low Cost Tactical Imager 0.0 3.5 12.2 15.0
HyperSoar 0.0 7.5 17.5 25.0
Rapid On-Orbit Anomaly Surveillance and Tracking (ROAST) 0.0 10.2 15.0 15.0
High Frequency Active Auroral Research Project (HAARP) 0.0 10.2 15.0 15.0
Suborbital Space Launch Operations 2.4
Space Assembly and Manufacture 7.7 13.0
Detailed budget 
estimates not available 
for FY06-FY09 
Total 0.0 110.5 209.4 230.7 248.6 321.8 346.9 381.0
DARPA RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
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A partial list other DOD space-unique technology programs is provided in Table 21: Other 
Space Programs.  A number of these efforts received substantial increases in the Senate Armed 
Services Committee Report that may survive conference, including: 
 
• $14.5 million in PE 62601F for novel materials and computing for space technologies 
• $7 million in PE 63401F for continued development of thin film multi-junction 
amorphous silicon arrays on flexible substrates for space applications 
• $6.8 million in PE 63401F to continue research and development on hardening 
technologies for satellite protection55 
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Table 21: Other Space Programs 
Cost (U.S.$ in millions)  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Multi-Disciplinary Space Technology 0602500F
Laser & Imaging Space Technology 5023 0.0 1.2 5.1 5.1 5.4 5.4 5.4 4.7
Human Centered Applied Space Tec. 5024 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Space Materials Development 5025 0.0 18.2 19.6 23.4 21.6 27.4 37.2 36.7
Rocket Propulsion Component Tec. 5026 0.0 23.1 40.7 43.7 45.6 47.9 49.0 50.0
High Speed Airbreathing Prop. Tec. 5027 0.0 4.1 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3
Space Sensors Photonics & RF Proc. 5028 0.0 43.5 1.7 2.2 2.0 4.2 4.3 4.3
Space Sensor & CM Technology 5029 0.0 6.9 12.7 5.6 1.7 5.2 7.3 6.3
Applied Space Access Vehicle Tec. 5030 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 8.2 7.3
Space Antennas Technology 5081 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 5.0 5.0
Optical Networking Technology 5082 0.0 0.0 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
Space Technology 0602601F
Space Survivability & Surveillance 1010 31.3 23.8 36.3 38.2 38.5 41.2 39.8 40.4
Spacecraft Payload Technology 4846 14.5 11.4 15.3 19.3 20.2 20.9 36.1 40.1
Spacecraft Protection Technology 5018 0.0 4.3 4.0 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.6
Spacecraft Vehicle Technologies 8809 33.6 36.7 27.6 30.4 31.4 36.2 43.6 46.6
Advanced Spacecraft Technology 0603401F
Spacecraft Payloads 2181 16.0 14.9 20.0 16.1 16.2 18.5 35.2 35.3
Integrated Space Tec. Dem. 3834 22.8 14.9 20.5 18.6 25.1 27.5 26.5 26.7
Space Systems Protection 4400 5.7 2.7 6.0 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7
Space Developmental Planning 4938 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Space Systems Survivability 5021 0.0 3.9 4.2 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1
Ballistic Missiles Technology 5083 0.0 0.0 6.9 6.9 5.8 4.1 4.1 4.2
Spacecraft Vehicles 682J 8.0 18.3 14.6 10.4 10.5 13.6 13.7 15.8
Multi-Disciplinary Adv. Dev. Space Tec. 0603500F
Advanced Optics & Laser Space Tec. 5031 0.0 14.5 19.6 23.8 26.5 31.4 33.9 35.8
Advanced Space Materials 5032 0.0 6.7 11.7 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.3 3.9
Rocket Propulsion Dem. 5033 0.0 25.7 22.2 22.5 28.2 30.8 32.7 33.2
Adv. Space Sensors 5034 0.0 4.8 6.1 9.5 8.7 11.6 16.1 7.6
Adv. Structures for Space Vehicles 5062 0.0 2.5 3.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.9 0.5
Total  136.8 281.7 305.5 298.1 309.8 358.4 425.1 425.8
Projects and 5023 and 5031 also appear in Table 1: Program Elements Comprising “Enhanced Space 
Operations”; Project 3834 also appears in Table 14: PE 0603401F Advanced Spacecraft Technology. 
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SECTION TWO: ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) SYSTEMS 
 
 In a December 2002 announcement, George W. Bush indicated that the United States 
would continue the “development and testing of space-based defenses, specifically space-based 
kinetic energy (hit to kill) interceptors and advanced target tracking satellites.”56  Accordingly, in 
the FY03 budget request, space-based elements formed a substantial portion of MDA spending, 
reaching almost 20% by 2007.  This figure actually tops 25% a year if one includes the SBIRS-
High (now SBIRS) program funded by the Air Force (Table 22: Space-based Elements in the 
FY03 Budget Request).  By 2007, MDA was expecting to spend 6% of their budget on space-
based kinetic kill interceptors and space-based lasers. 
 
 This section considers space-based interceptors and sensors, which form a substantial 
portion of the Administration’s FY04 budget request for spending on anti-ballistic missile efforts 
(Table 23: Space-based Elements in the FY04 Budget Request).  Although the Missile Agency 
no longer counts space-based boost-phase interceptors as a distinct program, based on 
extrapolations from the FY04-05 spending levels, the FY04 budget request appears to 
moderately accelerate the shift toward space-based missile defense interceptors. 
 
 
Table 22: Space-based Elements (% of MDA Spending) in the FY03 Budget Request 
 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Interceptors/Lasers 1% 1% 3% 4% 5% 6%
Sensors 4% 6% 7% 14% 11% 12%
Total 5% 7% 10% 18% 17% 18%
President's FY03 Budget Request, Does not include SBIRS. 
Table 23: Space-based Elements (% of MDA Spending) in the FY04 Budget Request 
 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Interceptors/Lasers 1% 1% 3% 3% 5% 7% 8% 10%
Sensors 5% 5% 6% 6% 9% 12% 13% 14%
Total 6% 7% 8% 10% 14% 19% 22% 25%
Source: Author estimates based on President’s FY04 Budget Request; Does not include SBIRS. 
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Space-based Kinetic Energy Interceptors 
 
 The space-based boost phase kinetic energy interceptor was initially funded as a distinct 
sub-element within the Boost Phase Missile Defense Segment.  The Bush Administration has 
moved toward an open-ended, evolutionary architecture for its ABM efforts, however, 
combining the space- and sea-based kinetic kill, boost phase efforts in a single program: Ballistic 
Missile Defense System Interceptors (Table 24: PE 0603886C Ballistic Missile Defense System 
Interceptors).  The funding profile for the combined program over the FYDP remains essentially 
the same as that for the two programs that were funded separately in the FY03 budget request 
(Table 25: Spending on Boost Phase Kinetic Kill in FY03 and FY04 budget requests). 
 
Table 24: PE 0603886C Ballistic Missile Defense System Interceptors 
Cost (U.S.$ in millions) FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09
0913 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Interceptors Block 2008 0 0 295.5 528.8 1,013.4 1,562.5 1,938.7 1,889.9
0013 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Interceptors Block 2010 0 0 0 0 97.3 146.4 585.1 974.2
0602 Program Operations  0 0 5.5 12.4 16.4 20.7 34.5 40.0
Total PE Cost  0 0 301.1 541.2 1,127.2 1,729.6 2,558.3 2,904.1
MDA RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
Table 25: Spending on Boost Phase Kinetic Kill in FY03 and FY04 Budget Requests 
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The ratio of spending within the PE for Ballistic Missile Defense System Interceptors 
also remains about the same as in the FY03 request, with more than half of the funds allocated to 
ground-based boost phase interceptors (Table 26: Project 0913 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Interceptors Block 2008).  This reflects a programmatic decision to mature ground-based 
technologies before tackling more difficult challenges involved with sea- and space-basing. 
 
 Of the remaining funding, $81.6 million is allocated for “testing and evaluation.”  This 
money is allocated for the Near Field InfraRed Experiment (NFIRE) satellite.57  According to 
one MDA official, “The objective of the Near Field InfraRed Experiment is to get a close-up 
view of a burning ICBM at conditions that are truly real world.”58  NFIRE will track two 
dedicated target launches, as well as other targets of opportunity.  The payload may also include 
the Generation 2 Kill Vehicle (KV) to “execute KV engagement with dedicated target” in 2005. 
 
Over the FYDP, the annual funding level for the BMDS interceptor program (which 
includes sea- as well as space-based efforts) will quickly exceed historical levels of funding for 
Brilliant Pebbles in the early 1990s (Table 27: Brilliant Pebbles, Then and Now).  Overall, the 
Bush Administration anticipates spending $13.6 billion—a figure comparable to 1992 and 1996 
CBO estimates—between FY03-04 on the BMDS interceptor program for the development costs 
of a constellation of space-based interceptors.  This program will be by far the largest program 
for the Missile Defense Agency by the end of the FYDP (Table 28: Spending on Selected BMDS 
Programs). 
Table 26: Project 0913 Ballistic Missile Defense Interceptors Block 2008 
COST (U.S.$ in Thousands) FY 04 FY 05   
Ground Based  184.9 341.7   
Space Based Test Bed 14.0 119.5   
Experimentation & Test  81.6 52.9   
Program Management & Engineering  15.0 14.7   
Total 295.5 528.8   
MDA RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
Table 27: Brilliant Pebbles, Then and Now 
Cost (2004 U.S.$ in 
billions) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997   93-97  
Brilliant Pebbles (2003) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7   3.6  
As a percentage of BMDO 11% 8% 7% 8% 8%   8%  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 03-07 03-09 
BMDS Interceptors (2004) 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.8 2.7 3.2 3.8 13.6 
As a percentage of MDA 0% 4% 6% 15% 21% 30% 33% 10% 14% 
1993 Estimates from Ray Hall and David Mosher, Cost of Alternative Approaches to SDI, Congressional Budget 
Office, May 1992, p.15 
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In addition to generous funding, MDA has articulated an ambitious schedule for the 
deployment of its space-based test bed comprising several prototype interceptors.  The FY04 
budget request includes $14 million for the space-based interceptor test bed that will fund 
multiple contractor awards, to be followed by a $120 million downselect in 2005 (Table 29: 
Space Based Test Bed Schedule).  Under this plan, MDA plans to begin on-orbit testing “with 
three to five satellites in Block 2008.”59 
 
There is little documentation available in support of the optimism expressed by the 
Missile Defense Agency.  The Congressional Budget Office reported that in response to a 
request for detailed cost-estimates of proposed space-based interceptor architectures, 
 
The most recent information CBO was able to obtain about that system was a 1992 cost analysis 
requirements description (CARD). DoD has not done a significant amount of additional work on 
space-based interceptors since the program was canceled early in the Clinton Administration.  
Thus, CBO has no basis for revising its previous estimate, which may no longer be applicable. In 
particular, it is unclear what the relationship might be between the 1992 CARD for Brilliant 
Pebbles and whatever space-based interceptor system might emerge from the research program 
that the Bush Administration is beginning..60 
 
 The lack of detailed information reflects a decision by MDA officials to delay the 
preparation of detailed life-cycle cost estimates until systems are transferred from the test bed to 
the services, a practice GAO strongly criticized in a 2003 report.61 
Table 28: Spending on Selected BMDS Programs 
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The four-year estimate to deploy simple space-based boost phase interceptors in a test 
bed configuration appears to be based on some of the most optimistic assessments advanced by 
proponents of Brilliant Pebbles.  Gregory Canvan, a physicist at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, recently estimated that the Brilliant Pebbles constellation could be deployed within 
four years for a development cost of about $13 billion ($10 billion in 1990 dollars).  It is worth 
noting that the last defense budget to contain substantial funding for space-based interceptors—
the FY1993 Request submitted by the outgoing Bush Administration—did not anticipate 
deployment of space-based interceptors until “a few years after 2000.” 
 
 Despite the large levels of funding anticipated by the FY04 Budget request, MDA 
appears to have cooled on plans to begin testing space-based interceptor components by the 
second quarter of 2005.  Citing a “combination of lagging technology and pressure from Capitol 
Hill,” MDA is now planning to continue basic research on the interceptor through 2008.62 
 
This decision follows substantial Congressional reductions in funding for the program 
element in the FY04 budget request.63  The reductions follow an expressed concern by the House 
and Senate Armed Services Committees that the program lacks a clear plan to cope with the 
technical challenges posed by boost-phase intercepts, particularly in sea- and space-based modes 
(Table 30: Appropriations for PE 0603886C Ballistic Missile Defense System Interceptor).   The 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees cut $150 million and $210 million, respectively, 
from the FY04 Request for the BMDS Interceptor. 64 
 
Table 29: Space-Based Test Bed Schedule 
Space-Based Test Bed FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09
a. Block 08 Multiple Contractor Award 4Q   
b. Block 08 Contract Downselect 3Q   
c. Design Review 1 3Q   
d. Design Review 2 3Q  
e. First Satellite Launch  4Q 
f.  First Flight Test   1Q
g. Additional Satellite Launches   1Q-4Q
h. Additional Flight Tests   1Q-4Q
MDA Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
Table 30: Appropriations for PE 0603886C Ballistic Missile Defense System Interceptors 
Request House Senate Conference 
301.1 151.1 91.1 ??? 
Senate Report 108-87, p.169 and House Report 108-187, p.211. 
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The Senate also adopted an amendment to the authorization bill offered by Senator 
Bingaman (D-NM) that prohibits the expenditure of funds to “to design, develop, or deploy hit-
to-kill interceptors or other weapons for placement in space unless specifically authorized by 
Congress” and states that only “$14,000,000 is available for research and concept definition for 
the space based test bed.”  Although the technical challenges of boost-phase intercept may 
prevent the effective use of the system in an anti-ballistic missile mode, the monetary allocation 
for research and concept definition recognizes the inherent capability of these systems as anti-
satellite interceptors.65  
 
Space-based Laser Technologies 
 
 MDA has a much smaller space-based laser program (Table 30: PE 0603175C Ballistic 
Missile Defense Technology) that has received episodic support.  Funding for the Space-based 
Laser (a cylindrical, hydrogen-fluoride chemical laser designed to intercept a ballistic missile in 
its boost phase) is well below what would be necessary to deploy such a system in the near-term.   
 
 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that developing a constellation of 
space-based lasers would cost-between $14-20 billion (Table 31: Costs Of A Space-based Laser 
National Missile Defense System).  The CBO based the estimate on existing MDA plans to 
conduct an Integrated Flight Experiment in 2012, using a single high-energy laser in orbit.  CBO 
estimated that pursuing a space-based laser in this manner would cost $3-5 billion for the IFE, 
followed by annual costs for development, production, and deployment of an operational system 
that would vary from $1-7 billion over FY13-25 (Table 32: Projected Annual Costs For A Space-
Based Laser, Fiscal Years 2002-2025). For purposes of the estimate, CBO assumed a 
constellation of 24 satellites.66 
 
 Last year, MDA closed its Space-based Laser (SBL) program office and canceled the 
anticipated 2012 test of the system.  MDA’s decision followed a $120 million Congressional cut 
to the program in FY02 and a decision by MDA not to seek substantial funding in FY03.67  
MDA Director Ronald Kadish told reporters that MDA would no longer focus on “putting an 
experiment in space in the near term . . . . Space basing of this capability can be looked at as a 
later improvement as opposed to a near-term imperative.”68  
 
 Despite the closure of the program office and transfer of assets, the level of funding for 
space-based laser technologies in the FY04 budget request is virtually identical to that in the 
FY03 request (Table 33: Comparison of FY03 and FY04 Requests for the Space-based Laser).  
This may reflect a decision to continue funding the program at minimal levels until a political 
decision is made to resuscitate the program. 
Table 31: PE 0603175C Ballistic Missile Defense Technology 
Cost (U.S.$ in millions) FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
0503 Laser Technology 0 0 47.1 47.0 48.9 48.8 49.7 50.7
MDA RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
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Table 32: Costs Of A Space-Based Laser National Missile Defense System, Fiscal Years 2002-2025  
(In billions of constant 2001 U.S dollars) Low High Low High 
Research and Development   14 20 
IFX laser 3 5   
Operational laser 7 11   
Launch vehicle 3 5   
Production   40 46 
Operational laser  27 33   
Launch Vehicle 13 13   
Total Acquisitions Costs   54 67 
Operations Through 2025    2 2 
Total Costs Through 2025    56 68 
Adapted from CBO, Estimated Costs and Technical Characteristics of Selected National Missile Defense Systems, 
January 2002 
Table 33: Projected Annual Costs For A Space-Based Laser, Fiscal Years 2002-2025 
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Space-based Sensors 
 
Satellite-based sensors are the largest space-based element in the anticipated ballistic 
missile defense system architecture.  Basing sensors in space offers numerous advantages, as one 
missile defense proponent noted: 
 
Space-based sensors can enhance the effectiveness of ground-based radar by cueing them as to the 
direction of the threat. They can also provide a highly effective countermeasure against simple 
decoys. Hence, the ability to deploy freely and employ sensors is critical to the role of missile 
defenses as both deterrent and defense.69 
 
Missile Defense Agency funding for sensor programs has been overwhelmingly dedicated to 
space-based systems (Table 34: FY04 BMDS Sensor Segment). 
 
 One space-based sensor, the Space Tracking and Surveillance System is the successor to 
the former Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-Low.  STSS is a passive, low earth orbit 
surveillance system that would provide global coverage of ballistic missile trajectories in all 
phases of flight (Table 35: PE 63884C Space Tracking and Surveillance System). 
 
Table 34: Comparison of FY03 and FY04 Requests for the Space-Based laser 
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After a February 2001 GAO report warned that SBIRS-Low program was "at high risk of 
not delivering the system on time or at cost or with the expected performance," Congress 
removed the SBIRS Low program from the acquisition track.  Congress instead appropriated 
$250 million for “Satellite Sensor Technology” to be used by the Secretary of Defense “to 
reduce risk and mature technologies for future space sensor applications for missile defense.”70  
In early 2002, MDA restructured SBIRS-Low and renamed the program the Space Tracking and 
Surveillance System.  Rumsfeld explained in testimony: 
 
Just last session, the Chairman and other members of this Committee raised questions about 
SBIRS-low. You expressed concern that the time schedule for the program was too aggressive, 
and the technology was not aggressive enough, suggesting we slow the program down and take a 
look at some newer technologies. We listened to your concerns, and agreed. And we have 
restructured the program—slipping it back two years and introducing newer technology.71 
 
The restructured program abandoned the planned 2006 launch date in favor of the modest 
goal of launching two demonstration satellites in 2007, followed by a second generation of 
satellites in 2011.72   These satellites may be deployed in one of three different constellations: 
Basic Coverage (9-12 satellites), Increased Coverage of key threat regions (18-20 satellites), or 
Worldwide Coverage (25-30 satellites). 
Table 34: FY04 BMDS Sensor Segment 
 Cost (U.S.$ in millions)  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
 SBIRS/STSS  234.1 286.3 300.2 329.0 517.5 851.0 1002.5 1188.5
 RAMOS  50.9 49.0 29.6 77.4 39.1 35.1 24.4 24.4
 BMDS Radars  0.0 0.0 101.0 144.9 133.9 136.1 102.5 22.2
 Testing and Evaluation 13.8 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Program Operations 14.2 10.2 7.4 11.4 16.1 21.2 23.4 26.8
 Subtotal  313.0 350.4 438.2 562.8 706.5 1043.5 1152.7 1261.9
SBIRS High  524.5 775.4 617.2 508.9 375.6 311.9 381.9 342.0
 Total  837.4 1125.8 1055.5 1071.7 1082.2 1355.4 1534.7 1604.0
USAF and MDA RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
Table 35: PE 63884C Space Tracking and Surveillance System 
 Cost (U.S.$ in thousands)  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
 5041 SBIRS Low/STSS  234.1 286.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 0812 STSS Block 2006  0.0 0.0 275.9 285.0 285.4 204.0 75.1 35.1
 0912 STSS Block 2008  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 82.0 177.5 88.7
 0012 STSS Block 2010  0.0 0.0 24.3 44.1 232.1 565.1 749.9 1064.8
Total 234.1 286.3 300.2 329.1 517.5 851.1 1,002.5 1188.6
MDA RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
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Even after the restructuring, a May 2003 GAO report warns that “DOD is at risk of 
repeating past mistakes because it has made decisions that are largely focused on meeting its 
2007 launch date. . . .”73   The cause for such concern is rooted in a GAO finding that MDA has 
made significant sacrifices in competition and risk reduction efforts in order to stay on schedule 
to meet the 2007 launch target.  Accordingly, the Senate Armed Services Committee asked for a 
cut of $15.5 million, citing an “unjustified growth in program management cost since fiscal year 
2003” (Table 36: SBIRS Low/STSS in FY03 and FY04 Budget Requests).74 
 
 Another space-based system, the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) is a 
joint U.S.-Russian program to design, build, launch, and operate two satellites that will provide 
stereoscopic observations of the earth's atmosphere and ballistic missile launches.  The satellites 
are scheduled for launch in FY07-08 with a nominal two-year on-orbit life expectancy and goal 
to extend the mission an additional five years.  RAMOS, along with the proposed Joint Data 
Exchange Center, was envisioned as a way to back-stop Russian early warning capabilities and 
build confidence in U.S. intentions.75 
 
Both programs remain moribund over administrative issues.76  The RAMOS program has 
been tied up in a dispute over a DOD plan to restructure the division of labor within the program 
The plan proposes that Russia will provide the launch capability, satellite platforms, ultraviolet 
sensors, and visible cameras, and ground processing and control equipment, while the U.S. will 
provide the infrared sensors and visible pushbroom cameras.  MDA maintains that a new 
government-to-government agreement between Washington and Moscow is required to release 
funding to the Russian firm Rosoboronexport and its Russian subcontractors. 77  
 
Table 36: SBIRS Low/STSS in FY03 and FY04 Budget Requests 
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In anticipation of a new government-to-government memorandum, Congress has 
continued to fund a restructured RAMOS program (Table 37: RAMOS in 2003 and 2004 Budget 
Requests).  Additionally, the Senate Armed Services Committee proposed language in the 
defense authorization bill directing that “no more than $24.6 million [of the $29.6 million] may 
be available for obligation or expenditure until a government-to-government agreement on the 
RAMOS program is concluded. The committee intends this restriction to provide an appropriate 
incentive to the Russian Federation to reach an agreement.”78  The MDA planned to spend about 
$11 million this year to contract with Russian partner Rosoboronexport, who will subcontract 
“the development of visible and ultraviolet cameras; satellite platforms; development and 
operation of the Moscow ground station; and launch services” to Russian firms.79 
 
 A third space-based sensor program, Space-based Infra Red System-High, falls under Air 
Force budgetary control.  SBIRS High will consist of a constellation of four satellites plus one 
spare in geosynchronous orbit, two sensors on a non-SBIRS satellite in highly elliptical orbit, 
Table 37: RAMOS in FY03 and FY04 Budget Requests 
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MDA RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
Table 38: Space-based Infra Red System (SBIRS)-High 
 Cost (U.S.$ in thousands)  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
3616 SBIRS High Element EMD 524.5 775.4 617.2 508.9 375.6 311.9 381.9 342.0
MDA RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
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and associated ground stations (Table 38: Space-based Infra Red System-High). The first launch 
of SBIRS High is scheduled for 2006.  SBIRS High has experienced large cost over-runs.  The 
program was originally projected to cost $4.1 billion (in 2003 dollars), but current program  
estimates are now double that figure.  In December 2001, DOD notified Congress that the 
program unit cost growth for the SBIRS-High program exceeded 25% in a single year (Table 39: 
SBIRS-High Cost Growth).80  
  
To avoid cancellation of the program, the Secretary of the Air Force was required by law 
to certify that the program was “essential for national security” and undertake restructuring, 
which was completed in January 2003.81  This restructuring program has caused concern in 
Congress, where the Senate Armed Services Committee noted that the latest restructure “will 
delay the acquisition of the third, fourth, and fifth geosynchronous satellites by two years and 
leave a three-year gap between the launch of the second and third of these satellites” (Table 40: 
SBIRS-High in FY03 and FY04 Budget Requests). The committee proposed language directing 
the Secretary of the Air Force “to develop a plan to reduce the production gap in the SBIRS 
program from two to one year.”82 
Table 39: SBIRS High Cost Growth 
Cost (U.S.$ in billions) Approved (March 1998) 
Latest 
(June 2002) Percent Change 
Research & development cost  $3.4 $6.0 79.9 % 
Procurement cost  $0.6 $1.4 154.0 % 
Total program cost $4.1  $8.2  99.7 % 
Program unit cost $0.8  $1.6 99.7 % 
Total quantities 5 5 - 
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs (May 2003) pp.57-58. 
Table 40: SBIRS High in FY03 and FY04 Budget Requests 
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SECTION THREE:  INTEGRATED FOCUSED SURVEILLANCE 
 
The final category is what the 1998 Space Command Long-Range Plan called “integrated 
focused surveillance” or command, control and intelligence (C2I).  The Nuclear Posture Review 
asserts that its “New Triad is bound together by enhanced command and control (C2) and 
intelligence systems.”83  
 
This section covers two “very innovative, creative, technology-pushing initiatives 
underway” to improve capabilities: Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and 
Space-Based Radar (SBR).84 
Transformational Communications Architecture 
There are three types of military satellite communications: wide-band, protected, and 
narrow-band.  Wide-band offers large capacity for transmission of relatively routine 
communications, while protected sacrifices capacity for security.  Narrow-band systems—not 
addressed in this paper—are principally tactical in orientation.85 
The Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) refers to two satellite legacy 
programs—AEHF and Wideband Gapfiller—and the third, transformational program: the 
Advanced Wideband System (also known as the “Transformational Satellite” or TSAT).  The 
Pentagon envisions these three programs as part of a common architecture that will “increase 
available bandwidth from 10 to 100 times existing capacity.”86  
The Air Force recently created a Transformational Communications Office to integrate 
the legacy satellite communications systems with Advanced Wideband.87  Although the FY04 
Budget Request is the beginning of that process, the final architecture remains contested. For 
example, the House and Senate have proposed reducing the funding available to the Advanced 
Wideband System, shifting money into the near-term priorities like the Advanced EHF system.  
The three elements of the Transformational Communications Office (two legacy programs and 
the transformational element) are described in the following paragraphs. 
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Satellite is a high frequency 
communications satellite constellation.  The Advanced EHF provides follow-on capability to the 
high frequency protected communications of the current MILSTAR satellite program.88  The 
Advanced EHF satellite has a requirement to channel data at a rate of six to eight million bits of 
data per second, a requirement that may prove optimistic.89 
The program has experienced substantial cost growth since the Air Force proposed a 
constellation of five satellites (four satellites and one spare) in a low-inclined geosynchronous 
orbit.  Initially estimated at a total cost of $4,071 million (2002 dollars), the program experienced 
a 36% cost increase to $5,561 million.90  Shortly thereafter, the Air Force slipped the first launch 
of the program from June 2006 to December 2006 and announced it would procure only three 
satellites, funding the first two with RDT&E funds and the third with procurement funds (Table 
41: Advanced EHF Program Cost Growth).91 The future of the remaining two satellites is 
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uncertain: The Air Force has announced that it will, by December 2004, select between 
competing options of a five-satellite Advanced EHF constellation or a three-satellite 
constellation augmented with Advanced Wideband Satellites.92 
The FY04 budget request includes $778 million for Advanced EHF, but has again pushed 
back the initial launch to the third quarter of 2007 and delayed a request for $95 million in 
procurement for the third satellite until FY05 (Table 42: PE 0603430F Advanced EHF 
MILSATCOM).  Both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees recommended an 
additional $60 million for AEHF.93  One representative said the increase reflected a shift in 
funding toward “near-term priorities.”94  
The Senate warned that the Air Force’s decision to shift $95 million in procurement 
funding from FY04 to FY05 would “result in a significant production gap that will require a 
costly requalification of suppliers, a significant increase in technical risks, and a possible delay in 
the AEHF schedule” and directed the Air Force to complete a study of the options to restore the 
FY03 program schedule by February 1, 2004.95   
 
The Wideband Gapfiller—or Wideband MILSATCOM—is precisely what its name 
suggests: a short-term solution to bridge the gap between current systems, such as the Defense 
Satellite Communications System, that handle the large volume of routine defense department 
communications and transformational programs like Advanced Wideband. 
 
Table 41: Advanced EHF Program Cost Growth 
Cost (FY03 US$ in billions) October 2001 December 2002 Change 
Research & development cost 4.4 4.6 6.2 
Procurement cost 1.3 5.1 -60.4 
Total program cost 5.6 5.1 -9.0 
Program unit cost 1.1 1.7 51.6 
Total quantities 5 3 -40.0 
Acquisition cycle time (months) 111 118 6.3 
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs (May 2003) pp.57-58.  Available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03476.pdf 
Table 42: PE 0603430F Advanced EHF MILSATCOM 
 Cost (U.S.$ in millions)  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM 459.6 822.5 778.1 573.7 402.4 317.4 189.6 130.9
Procurement 95.0 377.1 11.8 15.1
USAF RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
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Wideband MILSATCOM is expected to satisfy current wideband communications 
requirements at a reasonable cost by employing two commercial technologies—a digital signal 
processor and a phased array antenna—with some military frequency modifications.  Each 
satellite is capable of transmitting about 3,600 million bits per second—a dramatic improvement 
over the predecessor DSCS (Table 43: Comparison of Selected MILSATCOM systems).  
 
 The first launch of a WGS is scheduled for June 2004, followed by two additional 
launches no later than October 2005.96  Air Force procurement of an additional pair of satellites 
will round out the original design of a three-satellite constellation in geosynchronous orbit to 
help fulfill AEHF requirements in advance of TSAT launches (Table 44: PE 0603854F 
Wideband MILSATCOM). 
 
Table 43: Comparison of Selected MILSATCOM systems 
Satellite Communications Capacity (million bits per second) 
Cost Per Satellite 
(US$ in millions) 
Expected Lifetime 
(years) 
MILSTAR I 0.5 800 10 
MILSTAR II 40 800 10 
Advanced EHF 375 1,000 TBD 
DSCS III 100 200 10 
DSCS SLEP 200 200 10 
Wideband MILSATCOM 3,600 184 15 
Estimates from: Roy Axford, Advanced Wideband System (AWS) Analysis of Alternatives for Wideband Military 
Satellite Communications in the 2008+ Timeframe, CNS Workshop (1-3 May 2001).  Estimates for Advanced 
EHF vary slightly from estimates provided by GAO. 
Table 44: PE 0603854F Wideband MILSATCOM (Wideband Gapfiller) 
Cost (U.S.$ in millions) FY02 FY03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 
4811 Wideband Gapfiller 79.9 2.0 0 53.3 7.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 
4870 Command & Control System 16.5 11.8 36.7 20.4 8.3 7.0 5.7 6.3 
Total RDT&E 96.4 13.8 36.7 73.7 16.0 9.3 5.7 6.3 
Advance Procurement 13.5 0.0  0.0  0.0 51.0 53.0 31.0 0.0 
Procurement 347.8 188.2 34.6 21.5 9.4 214.7 139.5 43.7 
Total Procurement 361.3 188.2 34.6 21.5 60.4 267.7 170.5 43.7 
No. of satellites 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Air Force RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
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 The Advanced Wideband System or Transformational Satellite (TSAT) will 
replace the Wideband MILSATCOM and supplement the Advanced EHF system.  The TSAT is 
expected to integrate a number of technologies, including laser communications, that would 
dramatically improve the rate of data transmission in much the same way that fiber optic cables 
have improved ground-based data transmission.97  The Air Force is still conducting an analysis 
of alternatives to determine the final architecture of the system.  The FY04 Request includes 
$439 million for Advanced Wideband, a total of $12.5 billion across the FYDP (Table 45: PE 
0603845F Advanced Wideband System).  Undersecretary Teets testified that the first launch is 
targeted for 2009-2010.98 
This schedule appears optimistic.  The Government Accounting Office found that “Of the 
five AWS/TSAT key space segment technologies, one is mature while the other four are 
scheduled to reach maturity by January 2006, more than 2 years after development starts.”99  
Moreover, the House and Senate Committees cut $50 and $80 million, respectively, from the 
FY04 request citing the same concerns that GAO identified.100  The Senate Armed Services 
committee expressed concern that “key AWS/TCA technologies, including multiple access laser 
communications terminals and information assurance, are immature. . . .”101 
 The Senate and House Appropriations Committee cut $90 million and $150 million from 
the FY04 request, citing the same report.102  The House Appropriations Committee, which 
proposed restricting funding to technology maturation and risk reduction activities, noted that 
“Incredibly, DoD is pushing to acquire AWS on a pace that even exceeds the AEHF 
development schedule (known for its aggressive schedule) despite the significantly greater 
technical challenges associated with AWS.”103 
 
Space-based Radar (SBR) 
 
The most promising program for space-based ISR is the space-based radar (SBR) 
program.  SBR is “designed to transform surveillance by providing persistent, all-weather 
detection, tracking, and imagery of time-critical targets.”  The FY04 budget contains $299 
million for the SBR, which is the first space program conceived after the Air Force was 
designated as Executive Agent for space.  SBR has been designated by OSD as “as a key 
Transformational Space program inextricably linked” to its ISR requirement for transformational 
forces (Table 436 Spending on Space Based Radar).  Eventually, the Air Force estimates that 
annual funding for the SBR could reach $700-800 million by 2010, the expected launch date of 
the first satellite.104 
 
Table 45: PE 0603845F Advanced Wideband System (AWS) 
 FY03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 
4944 Advanced Wideband System 118.0 439.3 877.5 1183.2 1327.3 1531.0 736.9 
Air Force RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
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The Air Force is considering different radar constellation architectures in low- and 
medium-earth orbits (MEO), including a mixed constellation with satellites in both.  Although 
radar operating from MEO requires a dramatically larger antennae than necessary to achieve the 
same resolution from LEO, there are benefits to the mixed constellation.  As a DARPA official 
from the Innovative Space-Based Radar Antenna Technology (ISAT) Program explained:  the 
“primary reasons for even considering MEO . . . are the significantly reduced number of 
satellites required to achieve persistent 24/7 coverage and steeper razing angles, alleviating 
terrain obscuration.”105 
 
 According to a Raytheon official, the anticipated LEO constellation of 9-12 SBR 
satellites would leave coverage gaps that could last up to five minutes.106  The Senate Armed 
Services committee proposed language in the FY04 report directing the Secretary of the Air 
Force to submit a report on the various options for the SBR architecture and spiral developments 
(Table 47: Space-based Radar Acquisition Strategy).107  Similarly, the Senate and House 
Appropriations Committees, noting that cost estimates for the program had grown by 50 percent 
from the FY03 request, recommended $75 and $100 million reductions, respectively. 108 
 
Table 46: Spending on Space Based Radar 
PE Cost (U.S.$ in millions) FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
0604251F SBR EMD 23.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0602500F Multi-Disciplinary Space Technology 42.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0603858F SBR Dem/Val 47.2 274.1 358.7 467.5 503.8 1178.2 1547.5
Total 23.1 89.7 274.1 358.7 467.5 503.8 1178.2 1547.5
USAF RDT&E Descriptive Summaries.  Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/. 
Table 47: Space-based Radar Acquisition Strategy 
FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 
▲ 
KDP A 
    
Analysis of alternatives    
Risk reduction   
    
Key Decision Points 
 
KDP A: Funded concept studies approval 
KDP B: Pre-acquisition approval 
KDP C: Acquisitions and operations approval 
 
▲ 
KDP B Spacecraft pre-acquisition     
        
    
▲ 
KDP C Acquisition and operations 
   Block II requirements development   
    Block II risk reduction 
▲ 
IOC 
       Block II acquisition 
Shofner, Space-based Radar Industry Day Introduction and Current Status (May 30, 2003). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The programs detailed here represent a significant, but not comprehensive, portion of 
overall DOD spending on space-related programs.  Although DOD has improved its ability to 
track spending on space programs, the Congressional Research Service concluded that “tracking 
the DOD space budget is extremely difficult since . . . DOD sometimes releases only partial 
information (omitting funding for classified programs) or will suddenly release without 
explanation new figures for prior years that are quite different from what was previously 
reported.”109 
 
 The overall level of effort, however, is large and diverse. The Congressional Research 
Service estimates DOD’s total classified and unclassified space budget—including many 
programs that are demonstrably not space weapons—has grown from $15.7 billion in FY02 to 
$20.4 billion in FY04, and is projected to reach $28.6 billion in FY08 (Table 48: DOD and 
NASA Space Spending).110 
 
Although many of these programs face technical challenges that suggest the current 
acquisition schedules are too optimistic, the large amount of funding allocated to so many 
programs in so many areas strongly indicates that the Administration is serious about 
transforming the United States military, particularly strategic forces, though the introduction of 
new space systems.  Substantial levels of funding can create momentum in advance of 
deployments.  Moreover, the administration could deploy provocative capabilities in R&D 
blocks or conduct tests of existing ASAT systems for political purposes. 
Table 48: DOD and NASA Space Spending (in then year dollars) 
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Marcia S. Smith, U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military and Commercial (Congressional Research Service, April 
22, 2003) p.9.  Available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/civil/crs/IB92011.pdf 
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The move toward deploying the capabilities outlined in this paper—as part of a general 
effort to use space to support a warfighting posture—is consistent with the organizational 
decisions made by the Administration to reorganize DOD Space Activities.  Since January 2001, 
the Bush Administration has dramatically reorganized the way that DOD manages its space 
efforts.  Major changes include 
 
• Creating a “virtual” major force program to increase visibility of resources allocated 
for space activities. 
 
• Designating the Air Force as “Executive Agent” for space within DOD 
 
• Merging U.S. Strategic and Space Commands to capitalize on the “synergy” between 
space and strategic forces 
 
• Creating a “National Aerospace Initiative” to coordinate research on hypersonic 
flight, space access, and space systems 
 
Most of these changes, along with many others, reflect the reorganization of national security 
space management as outlined by the Rumsfeld Space Commission (Table 49: Space 
Commission Recommendations: Implementation as of January 2003).111 
 
 A more difficult task than identifying key organizational changes is identifying key 
thresholds for “weaponization.”  Currently, the most provocative systems remain a few years 
away from testing and deployment.  For instance, the Missile Defense Agency intends to 
commence orbital testing of space-based kinetic kill interceptors in 2008, but has canceled the 
anticipated 2012 test for its space-based laser.  The Air Force’s Common Aero Vehicle is 
perhaps a decade away from testing, while the unclassified space control systems are focused 
principally on temporary, non-destructive interference.  And, the military space plane concept 
remains, at best, a long-term aspiration for the Air Force. 
 
 Moreover, most of the programs considered in this paper are experiencing large cost-
overruns and delays.  Congressional skepticism concerning the technological maturity of a 
number of programs could further delay many programs as funds are shifted toward more 
feasible, near-term priorities. 
 
Opponents of expanding military activities in outer space should feel a sense of urgency, 
rather than complacency, for three reasons: First, these systems are the foundation of current 
modernization plans.  The central role that these capabilities are expected to play, combined with 
heavy investment, will create a strong momentum toward their testing and deployment.   In the 
absence of arms control agreements, there will be a strong presumption in favor of seeing these 
systems through to completion. 
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Table 49: Space Commission Recommendations: Implementation as of January 2003 
Space Commission Recommendation No action intended In progress Complete 
The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should meet regularly to address national security space policy, 
objectives, and issues.    
Secretary of Defense should establish an under secretary of defense for space, intelligence, and information 
   
Secretary of Air Force should assign responsibility for the command of Air Force Space Command to a four-star officer other than 
the commander, U.S. Space Command and NORAD.    
Secretary of Defense should end the practice of assigning only Air Force flight-rated officers to position of commander, U.S. Space 
Command and NORAD.    
Air Force should realign headquarters and field commands to more effectively organize, train, and equip for prompt and sustained 
space operations.    
Air Force Space Command should be assigned responsibility for providing resources to execute space research, development, 
acquisition, and operations.   n/a 
Amend title 10 USC. to assign the Air Force responsibility to organize, train, and equip for air and space operations. 
   
Secretary of Defense should designate the Air Force as DOD’s executive agent for space. 
   
Assign the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. 
   
Designate the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Air Force acquisition executive for space. 
   
Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence should create a research, development, and demonstration organization to 
focus on innovative space research and development.    
Secretary of Defense should direct the Defense Advanced Research Products Agency and service laboratories to undertake 
development and demonstration of innovative space technologies.    
Secretary of Defense should establish a Major Force Program for Space. 
   
GAO, “Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, But Further Management Actions Needed.”  Available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03379.pdf 
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Second, DOD is likely to deploy early R&D blocks of these systems well before the 
programs reach technological maturity.  Although these systems may have very limited 
functionality, other states that feel threatened by weaponization are likely to assume the worst 
about the systems—both as threats in themselves and as harbingers of future provocations. 
 
 Third, the United States retains a considerable residual capability to quickly cross 
thresholds as part of a political strategy.  Just as the Administration appears to have pulled out of 
the ABM Treaty for political reasons, and well in advance of encountering technical constraints 
imposed by the Treaty, they could decide to pursue the near-term testing or deployment of 
symbolic capabilities (particularly anti-satellite weapons) as part of a strategy to break the 
consensus for non-weaponization.  The KE ASAT program is particularly worrisome in this 
regard, because the DOD could test the KE ASAT within a year of a decision to do so and for a 
few tens of millions of dollars. 
 
 The conclusion of this paper is that the FY04 budget request contains a substantial level 
of investment projected across a diverse range of space-programs designed to support an 
increasingly preventive national security strategy.  One should not be surprised at the conclusion 
of the companion paper, which documents growing Chinese concerns about the evolving U.S. 
military capabilities and, by extension, intentions.  The U.S. is pursuing advanced military 
capabilities without simultaneously providing diplomatic assurances to our allies and potential 
adversaries that these capabilities are fundamentally defensive of the current international 
environment.  Perhaps most worrisome, the cost-overruns and schedule slippages suggest that 
many of these potentially provocative systems may be expensive, technological fantasies. 
 
 A more prudent approach might be a renewed diplomatic effort at multinational 
consultations regarding “rules of the road” for military activities in space, a focus on a smaller 
number of technologically mature systems to provide defensive protection for U.S. space 
systems, and cooperative efforts to maintain space situational awareness.  This will be the topic 
of a future CISSM paper.
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